Evidence for similar early but not late representation of possible and impossible objects by Erez Freud et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 16 February 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00094
Evidence for similar early but not late representation of
possible and impossible objects
Erez Freud1,2*, Bat-Sheva Hadad3, Galia Avidan1,2 and Tzvi Ganel1,2
1 Department of Psychology, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel
2 Zlotowski Center for Neuroscience, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel
3 Edmond J. Safra Brain Research Center, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
Edited by:
Gregory Zelinsky, Stony Brook
University, USA
Reviewed by:
Corrado Caudek, Università di
Firenze, Italy
Robert G. Alexander, Stony Brook
University, USA
*Correspondence:
Erez Freud, Department of
Psychology, Ben-Gurion University
of the Negev, The Abraham Ben
David Ohayon, Behavioral Sciences
Complex, P.O.B. 653, Beer-Sheva,
Israel
e-mail: erezfreud@gmail.com
The perceptual processes that mediate the ability to efficiently represent object 3D
structure are still not fully understood. The current study was aimed to shed light on
these processes by utilizing spatially possible and impossible objects that could not be
created in real 3D space. Despite being perceived as exceptionally unusual, impossible
objects still possess fundamental Gestalt attributes and valid local depth cues that
may support their initial successful representation. Based on this notion and on recent
findings from our lab, we hypothesized that the initial representation of impossible objects
would involve common mechanisms to those mediating typical object perception while
the perceived differences between possible and impossible objects would emerge later
along the processing hierarchy. In Experiment 1, participants preformed same/different
classifications of two markers superimposed on a display containing two objects (possible
or impossible). Faster reaction times were observed for displays in which the markers
were superimposed on the same object (“object-based benefit”). Importantly, this benefit
was similar for possible and impossible objects, suggesting that the representations of the
two object categories rely on similar perceptual organization processes. Yet, responses for
impossible objects were slower compared to possible objects. Experiment 2 was designed
to examine the origin of this effect. Participants classified the location of two markers
while exposure duration was manipulated. A similar pattern of performance was found
for possible and impossible objects for the short exposure duration, with differences in
accuracy between these two types of objects emerging only for longer exposure durations.
Overall, these findings provide evidence that the representation of object structure relies
on a multi-level process and that object impossibility selectively impairs the rendering of
fine-detailed description of object structure.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout our daily lives we recognize thousands of objects
quickly and accurately. One particular requirement for success-
ful object recognition is the extraction of object 3D structure,
which enables humans to recognize objects despite enormous
changes across viewpoint and size (Marr, 1982). To date, the
exact nature of the cognitive and neural mechanisms that sup-
port the representation of object 3D structure is still not fully
understood.
In the present study we utilized a special type of visual illusion
known as “impossible objects” to further unravel the perceptual
processes that mediate the representation of object 3D structure.
Impossible objects are defined as 2D drawings that represent
3D objects that could not exist in real 3D space (Penrose and
Penrose, 1958; Figure 1). At the 2D level, the physical differences
between possible and impossible objects are minor; however, the
3D interpretation of the structure of these two object categories
is markedly different. Hence impossible objects offer a unique
opportunity to test the representation of object 3D structure while
other visual properties are well controlled.
Impossible objects reflect internal inconsistencies between
the global and local information embedded in the stimulus.
Specifically, while the local elements that compose the object are
completely valid, the perceived global 3D structure is incoherent.
Such inconsistencies were previously investigated in the context of
different depth cues such as structure from motion, disparity and
perspective lines (e.g., Domini et al., 1998, 2006; Di Luca et al.,
2004; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Burge et al., 2005; Knill, 2007).
For example, Di Luca et al. (2004) found that the perception of
local surfaces that were defined by 3D structure from motion,
were biased by the global properties of the stimuli. These findings
strongly suggest that the perceived 3D shape is generated based
on the integration of various cues, and that the effect of global
information can be considered as automatic in nature. Accord-
ingly, previous studies that investigated the perceptual processes
that mediate the representation of object impossibility have found
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FIGURE 1 | Possible (upper row) and impossible objects (bottom row)
that were used in Experiment 1. Note, that the two sets of objects were
matched so that only relatively small physical differences would establish a
perception of spatial impossibility. Stimuli contained one (A) or two (B,C)
structural violations that induced object impossibility.
that the visual system is highly susceptible to detect object impos-
sibility even when it is task irrelevant. In particular, it was found
that a set of cortical regions along the dorsal and ventral visual
streams is highly sensitive to object impossibility (Freud et al.,
2015). Additionally, a behavioral study showed that 4 month old
infants looked longer at impossible objects compared to possible
objects (Shuwairi et al., 2007). Similar sensitivity was found even
in non-human animals (i.e., newly hatched chicks) that exhibited
a spontaneous preference to possible objects (Regolin et al., 2011).
On the other hand, other studies also showed similarities in
the perceptual and neural mechanisms that mediate the repre-
sentations of possible and impossible objects. Specifically, similar
Garner interference effects (i.e., worse performance in a classi-
fication task of a given object’s dimension when an irrelevant
dimension is varied; Garner and Felfoldy, 1970) was found for
possible and impossible objects, suggesting that the two object
categories were processed in a holistic fashion (Freud et al.,
2013a). Additionally, in fMRI studies, similar adaptation patterns
were found for possible and impossible objects (Habeck et al.,
2006; Freud et al., 2013b).
These seemingly contradicting findings imply that under some
conditions, the visual system is insensitive to object impossibility,
however, under other conditions, it may still retain great suscepti-
bility to object 3D structure and to the inconsistencies between
the global and local information. Importantly, as noted above,
impossible objects, just as possible ones, possess valid depth cues
which are based on fundamental Gestalt shape attributes (e.g.,
object closure, distinguishable surfaces, and volume properties)
(Koffka, 1935; Kovacs and Julesz, 1993; Geisler et al., 2001). Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that initial representations of these
objects could be successfully generated. Consequently, the spatial
ambiguity embedded in impossible objects may impair higher
perceptual processes.
We recently tested this view in the context of a behavioral
studies focused on the role of spatial frequency in the represen-
tation of possible and impossible objects. These studies already
alluded to a dissociable role of different spatial frequency ranges
in object recognition. Specifically, it has been demonstrated that
low spatial frequency (LSF) information conveys global properties
of the objects and supports the generation of their initial coarse
representation, while high spatial frequency (HSF) information is
processed later in time and supports the rendering of fine-grained
description of these objects (e.g., Sugase et al., 1999; Bar, 2003;
Bar et al., 2006). Consistently, using the Garner speeded classifi-
cation task (Garner and Felfoldy, 1970) we showed that a similar
processing style (i.e., holistic representation) was applied to both
possible and impossible objects following the filtering of their
HSF content. Contrary, when LSF information, which mainly
supports the initial representation, was filtered out, the responses
to the two object categories were dissociated. Particularly, possible
objects were still processed holistically, while impossible objects
were processed in an analytic—local fashion and were no longer
perceived as unified objects (Freud et al., 2014).
The current study was aimed to further investigate the per-
ceptual processes that mediate the representation of object 3D
structure. In two experiments, we tested two basic predictions
stemming from our working hypothesis. Experiment 1 tested
whether impossible objects are organized and perceived as uni-
fied wholes similarly to possible objects using an established
perceptual measure of object-based processing style. Experiment
2 further examined whether the observed differences between
object categories rely on early or on late perceptual processes.
EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to test whether possible and
impossible objects share similar initial perceptual processes using
an established behavioral paradigm. Specifically, we applied the
classical “object-based attention” paradigm originally devised by
Duncan (1984). In this paradigm participants are asked to per-
form simple perceptual classifications of two visual elements in
the display (e.g., same/different classifications) and the typical
finding is of better performance when the two to be judged
features, belong to the same object rather than placed on two
different objects. The common interpretation of this result is that
visual attention operates on object-based representations, and
is therefore constrained by perceptual organization processes of
object segregation (Duncan, 1984; Kimchi et al., 2007).
The main hypothesis was that impossible objects would have
a similar object-based processing style as possible ones. Specifi-
cally, we hypothesized that if the visual system constructs a valid
initial representation for impossible objects, similarly to possible
objects, these perceptually organized representations should cap-
ture attention so that targets placed on the same object would




Thirty students with normal or corrected to normal vision par-
ticipated in the experiment. They all provided informed consent
to participate in the experiment and received $5 equivalent for
their participation. The data of one participant was discarded
from the analysis due to exceptionally low accuracy (less than
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70% compared to average of 93.6% of the other participants). All
experimental procedures were approved by the ethics committee
of the Psychology Department at Ben-Gurion University of the
Negev.
Apparatus and stimuli
Three pairs of possible and impossible objects were used as
experimental stimuli (Figure 1). Possible and matched impossible
objects were identical except for one (Figure 1A) or two features
(Figures 1B,C) inserted to make the object’s global 3D structure
impossible. All pairs were used in previous experiments (Freud
et al., 2013b, 2015).
In each trial, a pair of objects (possible or impossible) was
presented (Figure 2). Stimuli subtended a visual angle of approx-
imately 12° and were presented on a 19 inch computer screen
(1024 × 768 resolution; refresh rate of 60 HZ). Additionally,
two red circles-filled or empty (a visual angle-0.3° each) were
superimposed on different locations on the objects depending
on the specific experimental condition (same object/different
objects). The circles were located on clear surfaces while avoiding
more ambiguous locations such as object’s counters. Critically, the
distance between the two circles was kept constant across trials
regardless of their exact placement on the screen.
Design
Object possibility (possible/impossible), targets location (on dif-
ferent objects/on the same object), object orientation (horizontal/
vertical; normal/mirror), and correct decision (same/different)
served as within-subjects variables with each combination occur-
ring on an equal number of trials (see Figure 2). The results were
collapsed across object orientation and correct decision after pre-
liminary analyses that ensured that these variables did not affect
FIGURE 2 | Examples of stimuli presented in Experiment 1. On each
trial, two red circles were superimposed on the display and participants
were asked to judge if the circles are same or different (rows). The locations
of the circles varied across trials such that for half of the trials the circles
were located on the same object (left column) and for the other half the
circles were located on different objects (right column). Display orientation
was counterbalanced across trials (see text for details).
the interaction between possibility and target location [Fs < 1].
Additionally, object exemplar served as a between-subject variable
(three levels; Figure 1). Both accuracy and reaction times were
recorded.
Experimental procedure
Participants were instructed to report as accurately and as quickly
as possible whether the two red circles in each trial were identical
(filled or empty) or different (one filled and one empty; Figure 2)
regardless of their locations. Object type (possible/impossible)
was not explicitly mentioned to avoid possible attentional
confounds.
Following four practice trials in which feedback was pro-
vided that were discarded from further analysis, participants
were presented with 256 experimental trials distributed equally
and randomly between the different conditions. The trials were
self-generated; each trial began with a fixation point (300 ms),
followed by the experimental display (1000 ms) and a blank screen
(1500 ms). Responses were recorded using a keyboard in which
two stickers were attached to the designated response keys.
RESULTS
Accuracy rate was high (93.6%). A repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) revealed no accuracy-based effects of object
type or of target locations [all Fs < 1]. Analysis was therefore
focused on RTs for correct trials.
Latencies shorter than 200 ms and longer than 1000 ms were
considered outliers and were removed from further analysis (4%
of the correct responses). The reaction time data is presented in
Figure 3. As can be seen, when targets were located on the same
object, reaction times were faster compared to trials in which the
targets were located on two different objects. A repeated measure
ANOVA revealed a main effect of target location [F(1,26) = 5.93,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.18] with no interactions with object possibility
[F(2,26) < 1], or specific exemplar [F(2,26) = 1.5, p > 0.2]. The
three-way interaction was not significant [F(2,26) = 1.6, p > 0.2].
Importantly, planned comparisons confirmed that the benefit of
FIGURE 3 | Reaction times in Experiment 1. Participants responded faster
when the circles were located on the same object (an object-based
attentional effect) regardless of object possibility. In addition, shorter
reaction times were found for possible compared to impossible objects.
Error bars represent confidence intervals as calculated for repeated
measure ANOVAs for the effect of circles locations (Jarmasz and Hollands,
2009).
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“same object” was evident for possible [F(1,26) = 5.42, p < 0.05]
and marginally for impossible objects [F(1,26) = 3.85, p= 0.06].
Interestingly, despite the fact the impossible objects drew
attention in a similar fashion to possible objects, a main effect
was found for possibility, with slower reaction times for impos-
sible compared to possible objects [F(1,26) = 12.8, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.33]. A marginal interaction was also found between
exemplar and object possibility [F(2,26) = 2.7, p = 0.08], indi-
cating a more robust effect for some exemplars compared to
others. Nevertheless, a similar trend of slower reaction times for
impossible objects was found for all exemplars.
Finally, for each participants only one exemplar was used along
the experiment to increase statistical power. A similar procedure
was also used in previous studies that examined the sensitiv-
ity of the visual system to object impossibility (e.g., Shuwairi
et al., 2007; Freud et al., 2014). However, repeated presentations
of these objects might reduce their perceived impossibility. To
examine this issue, we have reanalyzed that data separately for
the first and the second part of the experiment. This analysis
revealed that in addition to the main effect of object possibility
[F(1,26) = 14.6, p < 0.001], a main effect for experiment’s part
was found [F(1,26) = 29.6, p < 0.001], such that faster RT were
found in the second part of the experiment compared to the
first half. Importantly however, these two factors did not interact
with one another [F < 1], suggesting that despite the repeated
presentations of the same exemplar, the visual system did not
treat the impossible object as different (i.e., more possible) at the
second part of the experiment.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 show that impossible objects draw
visual attention in a similar fashion to possible objects. This find-
ing suggests that despite their unusual spatial structure, impos-
sible objects share similar perceptual organization processes to
those mediating the representation of possible objects. This same-
object benefit is observed despite the relative complexity of the
stimuli compared to previous studies (e.g., Moore et al., 1998;
Zemel et al., 2002; Drummond and Shomstein, 2010). Moreover,
for both object categories, the attentional capture occurred auto-
matically with an object-based effect obtained despite the fact that
the task was irrelevant to object structure (Kimchi et al., 2007).
One can argue that Gestalt cues such as common region,
closure, etc., which are evident for both object categories, could
account for the object-based effects observed for possible and
impossible objects. We cannot fully disqualify this alternative.
Still, a recent study indicates that a unified internal representation
of an object, rather than a mere collection of its features, is
required to support the object-based facilitation effect (Naber
et al., 2011). Thus, the object-based effect found in Experiment
1 for impossible objects implies that object representations exists
for impossible objects despite the spatial incoherency inherent to
this object category.
Note that the two circles were located on the same 2D
structurally possible surface. This was done to ensure that the
perceptual requirements were equal between the possible and
impossible conditions and that the circles were located on visually
identical locations for the two object categories. Presentations
of the circles on different surfaces for possible and impossible
objects could have therefore resulted in an unwarranted confound
which is avoided by the present design. However, this issue may
raise an alternative explanation according to which the attentional
selection was mediated by the processing of the 2D plane of
the objects rather than of 3D information. Nevertheless, several
lines of evidence are not in accord with such an alternative
explanation. First, in the present study a main effect was found
for object possibility, indicating that participants still processed
object 3D information despite being irrelevant to the task in hand.
Additionally, previous works from our lab and from other labs
have shown that object 3D structure is processed in an automatic
fashion (Goldfarb and Tzelgov, 2005; Freud et al., 2013a) and
that object possibility is processed even when object category
is irrelevant (Shuwairi et al., 2007; Regolin et al., 2011; Freud
et al., 2014, 2015). Hence, it is unlikely that the participants
independently processed the 2D plane in a unified manner, while
other portions of the stimulus were not integrated.
In addition to the main result of similar object-based attention
effects for the two object types, we also found some differences
between the processing of the two object categories. In particular,
slower classification times were found for impossible compared
to possible objects. The nature of the underlying perceptual
mechanisms that mediate the delayed responses for impossible
objects was further investigated in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
The overall slower reaction times found for impossible objects in
Experiment 1 could be accounted for by two fundamentally dif-
ferent plausible perceptual mechanisms. According to a bottom–
up scheme, object structural impossibility can be encoded by
a simple-to-complex architecture, based on hierarchical shape
detectors. According to such an alternative view, the spatial
ambiguity embedded in impossible objects impairs the initial
perceptual organization of this object category. Only later in
time along the hierarchy of visual processing, local valid depth
cues are used to support object-based representation. Note, that
previous research has shown that such models could account for
the representation of complex stimuli such as faces and objects,
and could also account for effect of global-configural organization
(Jiang et al., 2006).
On the other hand, according to our working hypothesis, the
initial representation of impossible objects is intact, and only later
in time along the hierarchy of visual processing object impossibil-
ity is represented. Experiment 2 utilized a different experimental
design aimed to distinguish between these two alternatives. To
this end, we tested when along the processing hierarchy the
perceived differences between the object categories start to emerge
by manipulating exposure duration. We used two exposure dura-
tions. In the short exposure duration the stimulus was presented
for 85 ms as previous studies suggested that this duration is the
minimal time required for successful object recognition (Grill-
Spector and Kanwisher, 2005; Sayres and Grill-Spector, 2006).
The long exposure duration was set to 986 ms to allow full
processing of object structure.
Importantly, in order to test object processing per se, we
adopted a new task in which only a single object was presented in
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each trial. Participants were required to judge whether two circles
are located on the object or whether one of the circles is located
outside the boundaries of that object (Figures 4A,B).
According to our working hypothesis, the initial perceptual
processes subserving the processing of possible and impossi-
ble objects should be similar and therefore no differences were
expected to be found between the two object categories for short
exposure durations. On the other hand, for the longer exposure
duration, we predicted that there would be enough time for the
incoherency of the structural information embedded in impos-
sible objects to be processed, which should in turn impede the
fine-grained representation of this object category.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty six students (none of whom participated in Experiment 1)
with normal or corrected to normal vision participated in the
experiment. They all provided informed consent to participate in
the experiment and received 5$ equivalent for their participation.
The data of two participants was discarded from the analysis
due to exceptionally low performance in the short exposure time
condition (<50%).
Apparatus and stimuli
Seven pairs of possible and impossible objects were used in
Experiment 2. Each trial display contained only one object that
subtended a visual angle of approximately 9° visual angle, and
was presented on a 19 inch monitor (resolution 1024 × 768;
refresh rate of 60 HZ). Two red circles (visual angle: 0.3°) were
superimposed at different locations on the objects depending on
the specific experimental condition. For half of the trials, the
circles were located inside the boundaries of the object, and for
the other half, one circle was located inside the object and the
other was located outside of its boundaries (Figure 4). Critically,
FIGURE 4 | Stimuli and experimental design Experiment 2. On each
trial, participants were asked to judge if the two circles are located inside
the boundaries of the object (A), or whether one of the circles is located
outside its boundaries (B). Exposure durations were manipulated to enable
minimal processing of the object (85 ms) or full processing of the object
(986 ms) (C).
the distance between the two circles was kept constant across trials
regardless of their exact position on the screen.
Design
Object possibility (possible/impossible), exposure duration
(85 ms/976 ms), object orientation (aligned /left/right mirror)
and correct decision (in/out) served as within-subject variables
with each combination occurring in an equal number of trials.
The results were collapsed across object orientation and correct
decision following a preliminary analyses which ensured that
these variables did not interact with possibility or exposure
duration [Fs < 1]. Different exposure durations were presented
in separate experimental blocks and the order of blocks was
counterbalanced across participants.
An initial analysis of accuracy scores revealed a three-way
interaction between exposure duration, possibility, and block
order [F(1,22) = 3.82, p = 0.06, η2p = 0.14], implying a carry-
over effect between blocks. To avoid this effect we discarded the
second block of each participant and treated exposure duration as
a between-subject variable. Importantly, the overall pattern of the
results remains similar between the two analyses.
Experimental procedure
Participants were asked to judge whether the two circles are
located on the object or whether one of the circles is located
outside the boundaries of that object (in/out) (Figures 4A,B).
The nature of the objects (possible/impossible) was not explicitly
mentioned to avoid attentional confounds.
Following four practice trials in which feedback was provided,
participants were presented with 448 experimental trials dis-
tributed equally and randomly between the different conditions.
The trials were self-generated; each trial began with a fixation
point (500 ms), followed by the experimental display (85/986 ms)
and a mask that completed the display duration to 1150 ms (1065,
164 respectively). Trials ended with a blank screen (1000 ms;
Figure 4C). Responses were given on a keyboard, similarly as in
Experiment 1.
RESULTS
The objective of Experiment 2 was to test whether the differ-
ences observed in Experiment 1 between possible and impossible
objects were mediated by early or by late perceptual processes.
Accuracy and RT were analyzed using repeated measures
ANOVA with possibility (possible/impossible) as a within-subject
variable and exposure duration (85 ms/976 ms) as a between-
subject variable. For the RT data, only a main effect of exposure
time was observed. RTs were generally faster for the long exposure
duration [F(1,22) = 4.67, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.17]. No effects were
found for possibility or the interaction between exposure dura-
tion and possibility [both Fs < 1].
The ANOVA for the accuracy data revealed a significant main
effect of exposure duration, with more accurate responses in the
long exposure duration condition [F(1,22) = 13.74, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.38]. More importantly, a significant interaction was
found between possibility and exposure durations [F(1,22) = 5.43,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.2]. Planned comparisons reveled that for
the short exposure duration, there were no differences between
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FIGURE 5 | Accuracy data for Experiment 2. Differences between
possible and impossible objects were found only for long (986 ms)
exposure durations. For short exposure durations (85 ms) no differences
were found between the two object types. Error bars represent confidence
intervals as calculated for repeated measure ANOVAs for the effect of
object possibility (Jarmasz and Hollands, 2009).
possible and impossible objects [F(1,22) = 1.88, p > 0.15]. On
the other hand, for the long exposure duration, performance
was more accurate for possible compared to impossible objects,
as indicated by the marginally significant planned comparison
[F(1,22) = 3.69, p = 0.06; Figure 5]. Importantly, the accuracy
rate in the short exposure duration was above 80% and therefore
the lack of difference between object categories could not be
accounted by a general lack of sensitivity (i.e., floor effect).
Finally, to ensure that in the short exposure duration par-
ticipants did not apply a strategy of attending one circle while
guessing about the location of the second circle, we computed a
sensitivity measure (d′ score), that took into account response bias
separately for possible and impossible objects. Correct responses
for the “in” condition (i.e., two circles that were located on
the object) were defined as hits, while incorrect responses for
the “out” condition (i.e., one circle which was located outside
the object) were defined as false alarms. These scores were
subjected to a repeated measure ANOVA. A significant inter-
action was found between possibility and exposure duration
[F(1,22) = 4.24, p = 0.05, η2p = 0.16] and planned comparisons
showed that the sensitivity was significantly higher for possible
objects [d′(possible) = 3.49, d′(impossible) = 3.19] in the long exposure
duration [F(1,22) = 4.58, p< 0.05], while no significant differences
were observed for the short exposure [F(1,22)< 1; d′(possible)= 1.96,
d′(impossible) = 2.06]. Importantly, the criterion, which reflects a
response bias, was not different from 0 regardless of exposure
durations [Fs < 1].
These findings indicate that the perceptual differences
between possible and impossible object arise at late percep-
tual stages while that at initial perceptual stages, the processing
of possible and impossible objects is performed in a similar
fashion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the current study showed that the representations of
possible and impossible objects rely on similar initial perceptual
processes, while differentiation between object categories emerge
only later along the processing hierarchy.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that impossible objects draw
attention automatically and similarly to possible objects, sug-
gesting resemblance in the perceptual processes that mediate
the representation of the two object types. Yet, differences in
performance were also found between possible and impossible
objects, with overall longer reaction times for impossible objects.
Previous studies from our lab already showed that possible and
impossible objects share similar a initial processing scheme (Freud
et al., 2013a,b). In Experiment 1 we validated and extended these
findings using a different, well-established paradigm of object-
based attention. Importantly, while previous studies required
overt judgments of object dimensions (e.g., size of a particular
dimension), here the objects were task-irrelevant and therefore
enabled testing whether attention can be allocated in an automatic
fashion even for impossible objects.
Experiment 2 was aimed to unravel the source of the overall
longer reaction times that were found for impossible objects in
Experiment 1. The results indicate that the differences between
possible and impossible object emerge only when objects were
presented for long exposure duration, and therefore are prob-
ably affected by late perceptual processes, such as the render-
ing of fine-detailed description of object structure (Hochstein
and Ahissar, 2002). Importantly, the level of processing is
inevitable, and participants could not “choose” to process only
the gist of the object. Presumably, in the long exposure dura-
tion the visual system automatically attempted to generate a
fine-detailed description of the impossible objects, however the
incoherency of 3D structure could have impaired this process,
and therefore the task (which relied on the processing of the
object) was performed less accurately compared to situations
in which the fine-grained representation could be successfully
generated. These results converge with a recent study from
our lab that used the Garner’s speeded classification task to
unravel the perceptual representation of possible and impossible
objects. In this study the level of processing was manipulated
by filtering-out specific spatial frequency ranges and not by
limiting exposure duration as in Experiment 2. Interestingly, it
was found that when low spatial frequency (LSF) information,
which usually supports rapid, coarse representation (e.g., Bar
et al., 2006), was available, similar processing style was observed
for possible and impossible objects. On the other hand, when
LSF information was filtered out, only HSF information was
available which could support late, but detailed processing of
object shape. Under this condition, a dissociation was found
between the object categories. Specifically, possible objects were
still processed in a holistic unified manner, while impossible
objects were no longer processed as unified objects (Freud et al.,
2014).
The investigation of the representation of impossible objects
could shed light on the cognitive and neural mechanisms that
mediate the perception of novel (possible) objects in every-
day life. In particular, the results of the present study could
be taken as a general support for the reverse hierarchy the-
ory (RHT; Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002) in the context of
3D information representation. In a nutshell, the RHT theory
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proposes that visual perception is based on two main stages.
First, a feed-forward processing stream represents the “gist of the
scene” while the exact details are not fully encoded. The second
stage is based on recurrent processing that relies on low-level
regions in the visual cortex and enables the encoding of detailed
information.
According to the RHT, object-based attention is accomplished
by fast feed forward processing. Thus, the similar gist, which char-
acterized matched possible and impossible objects, could have
mediated the equivalent object-based attention results obtained
in Experiment 1. Similarly, in Experiment 2, when objects were
presented for a short duration, the task could have been per-
formed based on the gist of the objects while the fine details were
not accessible. This could account for the similar performance
patterns obtained for the two object categories under this condi-
tion. On the other hand, when objects were presented for longer
durations, feedback processing could have taken place and the fine
details that define spatial ambiguity of impossible objects could be
processed, which in turn led to reduced accuracy for impossible
objects.
The perceptual processes that mediate the representation of
impossible objects could also be discussed in light of the Bayesian
framework. According to this framework, information conveyed
by the stimulus is represented by the visual system as a condi-
tional probability density function. The visual system uses past
experience to compute the most probable interpretation given the
retinal image stimulus (Kersten et al., 2004; Knill and Pouget,
2004). This conceptualization was developed by behavioral and
computational studies that demonstrated that Bayesian models
nicely fit to the perceived experience in a variety of percep-
tual phenomena, including depth perception which follows the
integration of multiple depth cues (e.g., van Ee et al., 2003)
and visual illusions of motion (Geisler and Kersten, 2002; Weiss
et al., 2002). Although the present investigation was not aimed
to test whether a Bayesian framework could account for the
representation of impossible objects, it is plausible that the visual
system erroneously estimates the likelihood of different depth
cues (global/local) which could lead to an incoherent percept of
the stimulus. Such a process may also mediate the behavioral
advantage observed for possible objects in Experiment 1 and in
the long exposure duration of Experiment 2. Future studies could
use this framework to further unravel how the brain estimates
and weights different types of monocular depth cues in a Bayesian
fashion.
To summarize, our findings suggest that initially, possible and
impossible objects are spatially organized in a similar manner
and that impossible figures are represented in a similar man-
ner to possible ones at least in terms of capturing automatic
visual attention. The visual system successfully utilizes intact
shape attributes to create a successful representation of impossible
objects. These properties override the odd spatial layout inherent
to impossible objects while the phenomenological differences
between object-types may reflect high-level perceptual processes
that occur later in time. Yet, the nature of these processes needs to
be elaborated by future research that will examine their dynam-
ics and the cognitive and the neural correlates mediating these
processes.
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